|
Instructors: Prof. Dr. habil. Josef Wieland
Event type:
Seminar
Org-unit: Sociology, Politics & Economics
Displayed in timetable as:
124043
Hours per week:
3
Credits:
6,0
Note: In your exam regulations, differing credits may have been specified.
Location:
Campus der Zeppelin Universität
Language of instruction:
Englisch
Min. | Max. participants:
5 | 35
Priority scheme: Standard-Priorisierung
Course content:
Institutional economic Theory of the Firm;
Transaction-cost theory, Principal-Agent-Theory, Property-Rights-Theory, Resource-based View of the Firm, Governance Economics
Educational objective:
The Students would
understand the basic of organisational economics and independently work out the texts relevant to the theory of the Firm;
understand especially the instutional economic theory approach of the Property-Rights-Theory, the Transaction-cost-Theory and the Principal-Agent-Theory und analyse it from primary texts.
Further information about the exams:
Endterm
Mandatory literature:
Machlup, F. 1967. Theories of the firm: Marginalist, behavioral, managerial. The American
Economic Review 57(1): 1–33.
Schumpeter, J.A. (7. Auflage 1993): Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Tübingen:
Francke, Chapter VII
Coase, R. (1937): The Nature of the Firm. In: Economica, Vol. 4, No. 16, pp. 386-405
Alchian, A.A., and H. Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs and economic organization.
American Economic Review 62(5): 777–795.
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling. 1976. Agency costs and the theory of the firm. Journal of
Financial Economics 3(4): 305–360.
Penrose, E. 1959/1995. The theory of the growth of the firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Richardson, G.B. (1972): The Organization of Industry. In: Economic Journal, No. 82, pp. 883-896
Williamson, O.E. (2005): The Economics of Governance. In: The American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 2, pp. 1-18
Wieland, J. (2018): Relational Economics, Chapter 1
|
