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Lehrende: Prof. Dr. Heribert Dieter
Veranstaltungsart:
Seminar
Orga-Einheit: Politics, Administration & International Relations
Anzeige im Stundenplan:
IPÖ
Semesterwochenstunden:
3
Credits:
6,0
Hinweis: In Ihrer Prüfungsordnung können abweichende Credits festgelegt sein.
Standort:
Campus der Zeppelin Universität
Unterrichtssprache:
Englisch
Min. | Max. Teilnehmerzahl:
10 | 35
Prioritätsschema: Standard-Priorisierung
Inhalte:
After decades of uncontested support for globalization, international economic relations are in turbulent waters. Populism in OECD-countries and the rise of China are two dimensions of this friction. Of course, the two are related: The rise of China had contributed to the reduced political support in the industrialized countries. President Trump and Brexit have been symptoms of the underlying problems. Thus, while Trump will retire, the underlying dissatisfaction with globalization will persist.
But why is globalization increasingly unpopular? And is this reluctance of citizens in OECD-countries a global phenomenon? Or are the old champions of globalization simply tired, whilst emerging societies like China, India and Vietnam continue to show an amazing interest in more, not less globalization.
Currently, both organizations that regulate international economic relations are in trouble. The WTO has been very unpopular in the White House and President Trump tried to weaken the institution. In finance, the situation is similar. Despite the renaissance of the International Monetary Fund since 2008, the future role of the IMF may be more limited than its supporters suggest. The IMF plays a very limited role in the debate on a post Covid-19 strategy.
In addition, the G-20, hailed as the new key forum for Global Governance, fails to deliver and may have turned into a talk shop in a short period of time. But why is this so? What are the political obstacles that inhibit successful co-operation?
Looking at individual economies, China and Germany have both been criticized for their economic performance. China is labelled a manipulator of exchange rates and as an economy that violates the principles of a market economy. Whilst the Covid-19 crisis will temporarily reduce Germany’s current account surplus, the massive support for German companies will enable them to outperform competitors both in Europe and elsewhere after the crisis. The current account surplus will most probably rise in 2021 and thereafter. Is the criticism of the two economies justified?
Lernziele:
In the seminar, we will both look at the historical evolution of the international economic order as well as at contemporary issues. The approach applied is international political economy, the key question being: Who benefits? In a more elaborate way: Who gets what, when, and why?
There are four main topics that will be discussed: Finance, trade, governance and China’s and Germany’s position in the global economy of the 21st century.
1) On finance:
Over the last 150 years, the shape of the international financial order has changed significantly. Whilst capital flows were not restricted before 1914, they were regulated from then until 1973. What has been the rationale for regulation as well as for non-regulation? What is the mandate of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? How do the perceptions of financial globalisation differ between developing countries and the OECD-economies? How do the two recent crises affect the future of global financial governance?
2) On trade:
International in goods and (increasingly) in services has been a major force in international economic relations. The World Trade Organisation WTO governs these processes. Simultaneously, the WTO is criticised for being a burden for the poor and the rich: Some argue the WTO is facilitating the exploitation of developing countries, others argue the WTO permits the undermining of social standards in the North. Furthermore, the WTO appears to be increasingly undermined by competing regimes, in particular by preferential trade agreements. Why are these highly bureaucratic and administratively complex trade agreements so popular?
3) On governance:
The G-20, created as a finance ministers meeting after the Asian crisis and elevated to leaders’ level with the first G-20 summit in November 2008, has undoubtedly the potential to become the key institutions for Global Economic Governance. Today, the G-20 hardly contributes anything to Global Economic Governance. What are the reasons for the apparent weakness of the G-20? Given the rise of rise, should a new group of democratic countries, the D-10, replace the G-20?
4) China and Germany in the global economy of the 21st century
What is the future role of these two economies in globalization: Will they continue to co-operate or will their relationship deteriorate? Is China’s “Belt-and-Road” Initiative an imperialist project? Is Germany a constructive or a destructive force in European integration as well as in globalization?
Learning objectives:
Students will analyse the history of international economic relations as well as very recent debates on issues related to trade, finance and governance. They will understand the inherent weaknesses of cooperation processes and will be able to apply these skills in the evaluation of current and future issue of Global Economic Governance. Students will analyse the legitimacy of the main institutions of economic governance (IMF, WTO) and will discuss potential avenues for the improvement of the perception of the institutions.
Weitere Informationen zu den Prüfungsleistungen:
The course will be taught in English. Thus, fluency in English is essential.
Each participant will have to make a presentation in the seminar (30 minutes) and participate actively in the debate.
The second component is an essay of 3.500 words (in English or German).
Composition of assessment: Presentation and essay 50% each.
The essential reading will be made available on Ilias.
Literatur:
Mandatory literature:
Autor, David H.; Dorn, David; Hanson, Gordon H. (2016): The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 21906, January 2016.
Baldwin, Richard (2014): WTO 2.0: Governance of 21st century trade. Review of International Organizations, Vol. 9, pp. 261-283.
Blinder, Alan S. (2019): The Free-Trade Paradox. The Bad Politics of a Good Idea. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 1, pp. 119-128.
Chen, Zhiwu (2015): China’s Dangerous Debt. Why the Economy could be headed for Trouble, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 3 (May/June 2015), pp. 13-18.
Dieter, Heribert (2020): Germany as a Leading Power: A Pipe Dream, in: Hickmann, Thomas, Lederer, Markus (eds.): Leidenschaft und Augenmaß. Sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven auf Entwicklung, Verwaltung, Umwelt und Klima. Baden-Baden: Nomos 2020, pp. 73-84.
Eichengreen, Barry (2008): Globalizing Capital. A History of the International Financial System. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2008.
Fukuyama, Francis (2016): American Political Decay or Renewal? The Meaning of the 2016 Election. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 4 (July/August 2016), pp. 58-68.
Rodrik, Dani (2011): The Globalization Paradox. Democracy and the Future of the World Economy. New York and London: W.W. Norton
Song, Zheng Michael; Xiong, Wei (2018): Risks in China’s Financial System. NBER Working Paper 24230, January 2018, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w24230
Winham, Gilbert R. (2014): The evolution of the global trade regime. In: Ravenhill, John (ed.): Global Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 108-138.
Additional reading will be made available.
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